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The history of retail has been an evolutionary process of new innovations and transformations. Previous 
changes include: the development of catalogue based retail, and the recent innovation of super stores, 
known as big-box retailers. It is possible that we are dawning upon a new revolution of the retail 
environment as electronic commerce (e-commerce) continues to grow. This paper will analyze the impact 
of e-commerce on retail markets, specifically big-box stores (warehouse style retailers with over 750 
million in sales). Using financial and real estate data from Bloomberg™, and e-commerce data from 
eMarketerTM and the US Census Bureau two models were built. These two models will be utilized to 
answer the following questions. Has the growth of e-commerce affected the retail real estate market and the 
retail financial market? Which retail submarkets have been affected most by the growth of e-commerce? 
The first model will test whether growth in e-commerce spending in retail submarkets (i.e. sporting goods 
and bookstores) will cause a decrease in the stock performance of big-box retailers within those market 
sectors. The second model will test whether growth in the different e-commerce retail submarkets will 
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Literature Review 
With electronic commerce, or e-commerce, now at 71 billion or 6.2% of total retail in the first quarter of 
2014 and growing at a pace of 15% annually as compared to 2.4% for all of retail, e-commerce is quickly 
gaining ground on the overall market. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014) Some industries have already abdicated 
to the growing power of e-commerce and other industries surely await. By 2014 e-commerce already had a 
39% market share in computer and consumer electronics, 29% in office products, and 60% in books, video, 
and music. (U.S. Census Bureau 2014) Those percentages have only continued to grow, and now 43.8% of 
books are sold online, 25% more than brick and mortar retailers, staggering growth since the early 2000’s 
(Greenfield, 2013) These numbers do not necessarily mean that retail as a whole is exploding, but rather 
transforming. From mom and pop specialty stores, to catalogues, to department stores, to big-box retailers, 
e-commerce is the next stage of development. This is a fascinating area of research and since the tech boom 
in the late 90’s there has been significant literature on the possible impacts of electronic shopping. Some 
predictions have proved incorrect, while other pieces have proved to be prophetic. E-commerce was 
predicted to impact various areas, including landlord tenant relationships, real estate value, transportation, 
and geography. 
One of the most interesting areas of impact from e-commerce is on the structure of commercial real estate 
leases. Typically rents are structured where tenants pay a base rent and then their rent increases by a certain 
percentage of their sales. This way the interests of the landlord and the tenant coincide. The tenant 
obviously wants to increase sales in a desire to make the space profitable, and the landlord will desire to 
make the surrounding area and environment of the shopping center appealing to customers in order to 
increase their rent profits. However, the introduction of e-commerce has caused a few problems with the 
landlord tenant relationship. Two areas of difficulty are the existence of ‘devil customers’, and the issue of 
showrooming. Devil customers are people who buy 20 different styles or colors of a product, only to keep 1 
and return the other 19 (Laseter et al., 2007). Although this is a huge hassle in terms of return policy, it can 
also cause a disruption in the percentage leases. When a customer returns 19 items to a store that were 
purchased online it counts against their sales at the store, thereby reducing their rent cost, even though the 
items were originally purchased outside the store. The second problem is showrooming. Someone may 
enter their local Best Buy™ and be looking at digital cameras, try out all the devices, but then decide that 
the store does not have the desired color. If Best Buy™ had that color available online, the customer could 
then buy it online in the store and that sale could not be tracked in order to be factored into the percentage 
lease.  
Researchers have long recognized this problem and have offered suggestions to modify the lease system 
into what is known as a “wired lease”. A wired lease is a lease that factors e-commerce sales into the 
percentage rent calculations. A few suggestions to correct the problem included using an inverse or 
negative percentage lease, raising the base rent, or using the web to drive in-store customer sales (Miller, 
2000). The idea of an inverse lease is giving the retailer a higher than market level rent, but then providing 
an incentive to increase in-store sales by having the rent cost decrease as sales increase. This would then 
motivate the retailer to include in-store online sales in their per-store calculations as well as create a system 
for managing online returns so as not to negatively affect sales levels at their brick and mortar stores. This 
does however have the possibility of disrupting the mutual relationship between landlord and tenant. The 
landlord no longer has as much incentive to maintain the grounds, as it will cause his/her rent levels to 
decrease. However, if the landlord responds in this manner, it is unlikely that retailers will accept these 
types of leases in the future. Yet if nothing is changed the growing threat of undocumented e-commerce 
sales still remains. Raising the base rent is another more simple possibility, but it also has its consequences. 
Although raising the rent would likely account for possible lost revenue due to devil customers or in-store 
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online sales, it is likely that retailers would react negatively and possibly transition their stores into smaller 
spaces and embrace the concept of showrooming. A smaller store would have a cheaper rent and with the 
availability of the online marketplace, stores could still have the same product variety available to 
customers, with a smaller store inventory. This would negatively affect landlords and is an unlikely option. 
The third suggestion encouraged property owners to embrace the “web” of challenges and use the Internet 
to drive traffic to the shopping centers. This could occur through a couple different formats, using web-
generated coupons, or have consumers order online and pick-up in the store. These two suggestions have 
been embraced the most by retailers since the digital age. Groupon™ is just one of the many online coupon 
marketplaces that are designed to drive customers to the store, where they are more likely to make impulse 
purchases. Retail researchers have long noted that the more time a shopper spends in a store and looks at 
products the more likely they are to buy (Beatty and Ferrell, 1998). The same strategy is in place for the 
buy online pick-up in store option, which essentially turns the store into a mini-warehouse, a practice now 
in heavy use by retailers such as Wal-Mart™, Best Buy™, and Home Depot™. This is especially prevalent 
with items that are inconvenient to ship to personal residences, like home appliances, furniture, and flat-
screen TV’s. These three ideas have been implemented with various success, and even though in 2001 16% 
of retailers claimed to be under a wired lease, this growth has since stagnated  (Worzala et al., 2002). 
Landlords have seen their power decreased and retailers are not bending to their demands. The process of 
measuring sales from e-commerce and applying it to specific stores is quite difficult, and to this day it has 
not been solved. “‘Many landlords are fighting to get percentage sales that somehow worm their way into 
Internet revenues,’ Brown said. ‘But the big retailers are generally saying ‘No,’ and most landlords are 
backing down, ultimately.’  ‘It is one thing if you have a solo shop with a website, but realistically how do 
you try to claim a piece of Williams-Sonoma’s™ e-commerce revenues for one store, say in Colorado? 
Plus the landlords need the retailers now more than they need any one particular landlord,’ Brown added. 
‘So outside of a few major players like Simon, Westfield, Macerich and others, it is not like the landlords 
have all that much leverage’”(Heschmeyer, 2014). As e-commerce continues to grow, it will be fascinating 
to see how this landlord tenant relationship is resolved. 
As shopping trends change so does the value of real estate. Big-box retail, the latest retail real estate 
development, quickly became the centerpiece of ‘suburbia’, large-scale shopping centers designed to meet 
all the needs of the surrounding community in one large real estate property. Research has shown that 
large-scale general merchandizers greatly outpaced the growth of smaller specialty stores from 1997-2007 
(Basker et al., 2012). It remains to be seen whether e-commerce will have a similar effect on real estate 
value. In the early 2000’s retailers acknowledged the existence of e-commerce, but most did not view it as 
a major threat to their brick and mortar operations at the time. In 2001, two-third’s of retailers expected 
their space requirements to increase or stay the same while only a third expected their warehouse or 
distribution space needs to increase (Worzala, 2002). This illustrates their complacency regarding the future 
growth of the online shopping model. Although mobile shopping, which is using a smart-phone to browse 
and purchase products online, did not exist at the time, some did predict its future. “Imagine, now a similar 
scanner with a built in computer, web browser and cell phone. Consumers could review products, try them, 
test them out, examine quality, then scan the product bar codes and search for the lowest priced retailer in 
either physical space or cyber space, then place the order” (Miller, 2000). He has perfectly described 
mobile showrooming, which now takes place at a large majority of electronic stores. Since January 2014 
58% of adults in the U.S. own a smartphone (Pew Internet, 2014). Not only is the worlds largest inventory 
available online, it is available at anytime, anywhere. It begs the question, how will the value of storefront 
property change now that products are so accessible from all locations? Most of the hype would say that 
this spells the death of brick and mortar retail, but further research would describe it differently. Although 
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some industries are specifically at-risk to e-commerce domination, for example: book stores, travel 
agencies, CD stores, and computer stores, (Baen, 2000) most have embraced the concept of omnichannel 
retailing. This means having your brand meet the needs of the customer across all possible platforms, 
online, mobile, and in-store. Rather than decreasing the value of storefront property, the importance of 
prime location has become all the more important. Consumers now have multiple fronts to shop from, and 
therefore shopping is viewed as more of the entertainment option.  
Since the recession in 2008, a great divide has emerged between the profitability of shopping centers with 
prime location, and those under depressed conditions (Ahlburn, 2014). Jones Lang LaSalle™, a research 
real estate firm analyzed vacancy rates of four different types of centers; community centers, neighborhood 
and strip centers, power centers, and regional and super regional centers. They then classified them into two 
groups, centers with at least 80% occupancy prior to the recession (prime location), and centers with less 
than 80% occupancy (poor location).  The vacancy rates of regional and super regional centers with prime 
location (Centers with anchors tenants like Home Depot or Best Buy) have fallen below 3% while those 
with poor location have risen above 50%, a stark contrast. (Ahlburn, 2014) Although this does not 
necessarily demonstrate that e-commerce was the cause, there is evidence that it could have possibly been a 
factor. There are a couple reasons that this could be the case. The two types of centers that have performed 
the worst in poor locations are the regional and super regional centers as well as the power centers. These 
are the two largest types of centers, malls and shopping centers with multiple big-box tenants. While on the 
other hand, in the areas of prime surroundings, the centers with the lowest vacancy rates are also the super 
regional, regional, and power centers. The narrative that could be at play is as follows: the entertainment 
value of shopping has become a greater priority than the necessity of shopping with the emergence of e-
commerce. Therefore, when consumers desire to shop they will go to an area of prime location and 
environment, and when they need a product they will be more likely to use the convenience of the online 
platform. This means that areas of poor location are performing worse with the emergence of e-commerce, 
because they will purchase their necessities online and go to areas of prime location for a shopping 
experience. More data is needed in this area, but it seems that with the growth of mobile e-commerce the 
real estate value of shopping centers with good location have risen dramatically, while those with aging 
assets or poor surroundings have seen their investment struggle. 
E-commerce also provides intriguing questions on issues of transportation and geography. Where will the 
new retail investment take place? What transformations of transportation and shipping will take place in 
order to meet the growing demand of in-home customer fulfillment? One of the first changes is a shift in 
transportation, from personal car to freight. The responsibility of movement to the consumer’s residence is 
now shifted to the retailer or contracted out to one of the major courier services, such as UPS™ or 
FedEx™. This is added responsibility on the retailer and an extra expense to the consumer; but as logistics 
services improve, it will likely become more efficient and less expensive. At first thought it would seem 
that individual parcel delivery would be more expensive than large scale deliveries to a store; however, the 
sheer scale at which courier services like UPS and FedEx operate allows there to be cost savings in 
combining multiple individual shipments and reducing the cost of holding a large inventory (Anderson et 
al., 2003). There has also been growth in areas of large-scale crowdsourcing in order to deliver products. 
Crowdsourcing is a term for utilizing and organizing the masses for a specific purpose using online forums. 
This has been used in everything from fundraising (Kickstarter™) to taxi services (Uber™), which 
connects drivers and passengers together on their everyday normal routes through a mobile app. The same 
process is beginning with courier services. Deliv™ is a mobile app that connects drivers and consumers for 
the purpose of delivering an item bought online. For only a small fee of $5 a consumer can buy an item 
online and have it delivered the same day. Since its inception in 2012 its client list already includes major 
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commercial real estate companies such as Simon Property Group™, and large number of major retailers 
including Staples™, Banana Republic™, Chico’s™, and Williams-Sonoma™. The growth of this service is 
a competitive win for traditional retailers over e-commerce power Amazon™, as it provides competition in 
a space that Amazon™ was looking to dominate, same-day service. Whether by growth of major courier 
services or crowdsourcing, e-commerce is changing the transportation between the retailer and the 
consumer. 
Geographical change is just as likely as growth in distribution centers will cause some shift away from 
brick and mortar retail. Amazon as of 2013 has 94 fulfillment centers worldwide (Kucera, 2013). Even 
though it would seem that e-commerce with all its technological promise would cause there to be less 
physical investment, the reality is that space is just shifting location. “…there are significant ‘back region’ 
spaces, which are needed to sustain and fulfill B2C (Business to Consumer) e-commerce orders. These 
back region spaces, warehouse and distribution centers, are the lifeblood of the e-commerce industry and 
are where many ‘e-tailers’ have faltered” (Wrigley and Currah, 2006). These backroom spaces are 
expensive, which is why current large-scale retailers have a huge advantage in already having the 
distribution center infrastructure. Retailers must adapt and use their existing structures (stores and 
distribution centers) to meet the needs of customers in multiple formats, an entertaining shopping 
experience, a pick-up in store option, and an in-home delivery option.  Home DepotTM clearly demonstrates 
this in their annual 10k: “The interconnected retail initiative is woven throughout our business and connects 
our other three key initiatives. At the core of this initiative is using our almost 2,000 U.S. stores as a 
network of convenient locations for our customers who shop online. In fiscal 2013, we completed our 
rollout of Buy Online, Ship to Store (“BOSS”) and Buy Online, Return In Store (“BORIS”), which 
complement Buy Online, Pick-up In Store (“BOPIS”), introduced in fiscal 2011. We also began the 
groundwork for Buy Online, Deliver From Store (“BODFS”), which will give us the capability to deliver 
orders placed online from our stores to the customer’s home or job site”(Home Depot 2014). E-commerce 
has and will continue to change the retail process, from where the product originates, to how the goods are 
transported to the customer; traditional structures of retail are continually being challenged. 
Financial Model Methodology 
The first model is a panel data statistical model, which means the data is cross-sectional and time series in 
nature. This Fama-French stock response model is meant to model the impact of different variables on 
stock returns. The Fama French model was developed as an improvement of the CAPM (Capital Asset 
Pricing Model) which is used to describe the performance of stocks. Two University of Chicago professors, 
Kenneth French and Eugene Fama helped develop this model and it is now considered the standard asset 
pricing model in finance (Armstrong, 2013). This model is continually being developed and they currently 
have two more factors outlined in a working paper (Fama French, 2014) 
FPit  = ui + B1MEcomjt + B2RmRft + B3SMBt + B4HMLt + B5UMDt + Eit 
 
FP = Annual Stock Return of Big-box retailer 
MEcom = Market percentage of e-commerce in each retail category 
RmRf = Return of the market minus the risk free rate 
SMB = Small cap stock minus big cap stocks 
HML = High book to market stocks minus low book to market stocks 
UMD = Carhart Momentum factor 
E = random error 
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This model will attempt to get a more accurate picture of the impact of e-commerce on the financial 
performance of big-box retailers. I will explain the role that each variable plays in the model. 
The subscript i and j stand for the differences in the data-set of each of the variables. Some data I have at 
the individual firm level (ex. stock returns of the big box retailers) Some data is at the industry level (e-
commerce market percentage), and the other four Fama French factors are at the national level, measuring 
the overall health of the US Economy 
FP: This is the dependent variable. It is the annual stock return of each individual big-box retailer.  
MEcom: This is the e-commerce market percentage growth rate in each retail category. The first factor is 
the return of the market minus the risk free rate. This is attempting to control for the performance of the 
overall stock market and its affect on the limited number of stocks that are in my models portfolio. 
RmRf: This is one of the 4 factors in a Fama-French stock response model. The first factor is the return of 
the market minus the risk free rate. This is attempting to control for the performance of the overall stock 
market and its affect on the limited number of stocks that are in my models portfolio. 
SMB: This is one of the 4 factors in a Fama-French stock response model. This checks to see how exposed 
the dependent variable data set is to small cap stocks. Kenneth French found that small caps tend to 
perform better than large cap stocks, so this variable is important to see how weighted the data set is to one 
or the other. 
HML: This is one of the 4 factors in a Fama-French stock response model. The factor is High book to 
market minus Low book to market, essentially comparing the difference between value and growth stocks. 
This checks to see how exposed the dependent variable data set is to high book to market ratio stocks. 
Kenneth French found that high book to market ratio stocks tend to perform better than low book to market 
stocks. 
UMD: This is one of the 4 factors in a Fama-French stock response model. It is called the Carhart 
momentum factor. If a stock is on a massive rise or decline, it controls for its effect on the overall model. 
Real Estate Model Methodology 
The second model is a panel data time series model in which we used a fixed effects regression to measure 
the impact of e-commerce market percentage growth on the square footage growth rate of big-box retailers. 
This model uses elements of a similar study, which depicts the growth in square footage of the office 
building sector market (Rosen, 2003). 
SFit = ui + B1MEcomlag1jt + B2CPXjt + B3TotalSaleslag1jt  + B4Rexpt + B5Closelag1jt + Eit  
 SF = Annual growth rate in retail square footage for each company 
 MEcomlag1 = One year lag of the e-commerce market percentage growth rate 
 CPX = Capital Expenditures growth rate in each retail category 
 TotalSaleslag1 = One year lag of the growth rate of total sales in each retail category 
 Rexp = Estimated price per square foot growth rate of each big-box retailer 
 Closelag1 = Estimated size of business (sales) that closed in an industry lagged by one 
year 
SF: This is the dependent variable, assembled from the 10k of each big-box retailer. 
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MEcomlag1 = Market percentage of e-commerce in each retail category lagged by 1 year. This is because 
we anticipate that the e-commerce market percentage from the year before is going to be affecting the 
decisions made on real estate expansion for this year.  
CPX = Capital Expenditures is attempting to control for economy wide growth of new buildings. If the 
overall economy is investing in commercial real estate then it is likely big-box retailers will also experience 
growth. 
TotalSaleslag1 = Controlling for the growth rate in industry-wide sales for that year. It is lagged one year 
because if sales in the industry had a large growth rate from the year before, it is likely to mean greater 
expansion in square footage the next year. 
Rexp = Estimated cost of price per sq foot. We determined an estimated price per square foot by dividing 
the total rent expense for that year by the total amount of retail square footage leased. Price per square foot 
is important because the higher the market prices per square foot are for commercial real estate leases, than 
the less likely a company is to expand 
Closelag1 = Controlling for businesses that closed in an industry that year. With the Closelag1 variable we 
are attempting to control for a large business in an industry closing its doors, and the other companies 
gaining retail square footage due to less competition 
One particular point in the data set required an extra regression to estimate a specific variable. In the year a 
company went out of business, their real estate growth rate was -1, but we needed a way to estimate what 
the price per square foot (Rexp) would have been that next year in order to keep that variable within the 
model. Therefore, we ran a separate regression to estimate what the price per square foot growth rate would 
have been based on a few different variables. The regression is as follows: Price per square foot growth rate 
is a function of the square footage growth rate of big-box retailers plus the total sales growth rate of the 
retail category plus the capital expenditures growth rate in the retail category plus the growth rate of US 
GDP. 
Financial Model Data 
I compiled data from various agencies. I have used the U.S. Census Bureau E-stats and statistical abstract 
reports, eMarketer’sTM e-commerce data, Bloomberg™ financials, and Kenneth French’s stock-response 
model data. The E-stats provide market percentages (ex. e-commerce sales in retail category/total sales in 
retail category) and total sales of e-commerce in each retail category from 2000 to 2007. The U.S. Census 
Bureau statistical abstract provides total retail sales in each category from 2000 to 2014.  The eMarketerTM 
reports give e-commerce sales from 2008-2014. BloombergTM provided the financial data for various big-
box retailers. Kenneth French provides the data for the four variables of the Fama-French stock response 
model. 
The first task for the first model was to separate the retail data into six different retail categories: Apparel, 
Books Music and Video, Consumer Electronics, Health, Toys and Hobby, and Office. For the financial data 
we compiled the stock returns for the largest public big-box retail companies. There are a total of 32 
companies in the data set.  
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The first model also needed data on the e-commerce market percentages for each retail category from 
2000-2013. Unfortunately the data from the U.S. Census Bureau and eMarketerTM did not line up as they 
likely had different assumptions in collecting the data. Therefore I had to make estimates on what the e-
commerce market percentage was in each of the retail categories from 2008-2013. Although they are 
estimates I will share the process of how I achieved these numbers, and I believe they are fairly accurate. 
For the years 2000-2007 we have e-commerce total sales in each category as well as e-commerce market 
percentage provided by the US Census. When we divide the total sales by the market percentage we can 
obtain the “implied” total retail sales. However the US Census also maintains a separate data-set which 
collects supposedly that same figure “total retail sales in a retail category”. Unfortunately these two data-
sets do match up, likely due to differing assumptions. When-Marketer began collecting the data in 2008, 
they only collected e-commerce total sales in the category, not the e-commerce market percentage. 
Therefore we needed to determine the market percentage by dividing the total e-commerce sales, by the 
total retail sales. The problem lied in the fact that the implied total retail sales from the previous data in 
2000-2007 did not match up with the total retail sales from those same years as shown in the figure below. 
In order to determine the implied total retail sales for the years 2000-2014 we used the growth rates from 




In order to prevent confusion between the two data sets we will call the first data-set the “implied total 
retail sales” (ITRS), and the second data set the “bureau total retail sales” (BTRS).  
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In order to find the implied total retail sales for 2008-2013, we must multiply the implied total retail sales 
from 2007 by the growth rate of the bureau total retail sales data. This insures that the implied total retail 
sales data from 2008-2013 matches the same pattern as the bureau total retail sales.  
ITRS 08 = ITRS 07 * [(BTRS 08 –BTRS 07)/BTRS 07] 
Now that we have the implied total retail sales from 2008-2013, we are able to use the total e-commerce 
sales from 2008-2013 from eMarketer to figure out what the e-commerce market percentage is from 2008-
2013. We do this by dividing the e-commerce total sales by the implied total retail sales in order to get the 
e-commerce market percentage. When we do this for all the retail categories we are able to have a complete 
data set of e-commerce market percentage from 2000-2014. 
E-commerce market percentage 2008 = e-commerce total sales / ITRS 08 
Now that we have a background on the origin of the data, I can present the hypothesis over-arching 
hypothesis behind the two models. 
Using the data described above we can make some interesting observations from the graphs of the e-
commerce market percentage growth over time as well as the stock returns of each retail category over 
time. In viewing the graph of the e-commerce market percentage growth from 2001-2014 you can see that 
the different retail categories are dramatically different in terms of their market percentage growth.  
 
As would be expected, Books Music and Video has the highest e-commerce market percentage with 60% 
of those goods sold online, a growth from only 8% in 2000. With the dominance of Amazon and Netflix 
this is to be expected. Consumer electronics is the next highest with 39% of those goods sold online. At 
29% are both Office products and Toys and Hobby. At around 12% is Apparel and Consumer Health. 
Despite the efforts of Amazon Fresh and others the Food and Beverage sector is still negligible in terms of 
e-commerce market percentage.  
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It is interesting to then compare to the stock returns of each of these retail categories to see if there is any 
correlation between the e-commerce market percentage and the stock return in that big-box retail category. 
If you look at the Consumer Electronics stock percentage growth graph you can see how the six different 
retailers have performed since 2001. Two have ceased to exist, Ultimate Electronics in 2005, and Circuit 
City in 2011. The other companies tend to oscillate between positive and negative percentage growth, but 
lean overall toward negative returns in the stock market. This is then an interesting comparison to the 
Apparel Stock Percentage Growth graph. This graph has 8 different apparel big- box retailers, and it is 
incredible how they move together in lock step. Aside from the recession time period from 2007-2008 the 
apparel retail category sector has generally seen small but positive return in the stock market.  
 
 
Another point of comparison is to the overall economy. Using Kenneth French’s RmRf variable which 
calculates the return of the market minus the risk-free rate, we can see how the overall economy has 
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performed. Looking at the Stock Market Percentage Growth graph it is fascinating how similar it is to the 
Apparel stock return graph. This shows that even though e-commerce might be having some effect on the 
stock return of these big-box retailers, most of the change is highly correlated to how the overall economy 
is performing. However, due to the variability shown in the consumer electronics stock return sector, whose 
retail category has seen a much higher e-commerce market percentage growth, it is probable that some of 
this variation in the stock return is due to the growth of e-commerce.  
 
 
Before describing the model and results of the regression it is important to fully explain the original 
hypothesis. From the raw data as described in the previous section we can see that many different retail 
sectors have seen large growth in e-commerce market percentage. The question is has that e-commerce 
growth come from the e-commerce programs of the big-box retailers themselves? Or, is it the result of 
online only retailers like Amazon? From the figure in the appendix we can see that Amazon’s total online 
sales dwarf the competition from the next 9 retailers combined. From this figure we can imply that the 
online growth is largely the result of Amazon and other e-tailer’s gaining market share of each of these 











2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Stock Market Percentage Growth 
Rm ‐ Rf 
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So the hypothesis is as follows, as the e-commerce market percentage grows (likely as the result of 
Amazon gaining market share) the stock returns of the big-box retailers will struggle as a result. Therefore, 
when we run a regression we are expecting to see a negative coefficient on the e-commerce market 
percentage growth variable and for that variable to be significant to the model. 
Real Estate Model Data 
The second model has similar sources, US Census, eMarketer, and Bloomberg, but is compiling a different 
set of data. The e-commerce market percentage is compiled the same way, with a combination of both US 
Census and eMarketer data that is merged according to the formulas that I described in the last model. The 
dependent variable in this model is the growth rate of retail square footage for big box retailers. The source 
of this data is within the annual reports of the big-box retailers, which Bloomberg has compiled for our 
usage. Another important variable that we obtained was the price per square foot for each big box retailer. 
Using the total square footage and total rent expense, both obtained from Bloomberg, I estimated the price 
per square foot for each retailer. 
Price per square foot = total retail square footage / total rent expense 
I also obtained two different data sets from the US Census Bureau. Total sales in each retail category as 
well as capital expenditure spending in each retail category. Lastly I used Gale Virtual Reference Library to 
estimate the approximate size (total sales) of private businesses for the year that they ceased to exist. This is 
to counteract the impact that a large private business would have on the industry if it went out-of-business. 
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The first data set that was a possible clue to the emerging changes in retail real estate was a 2012 study 
done by Jones Lang and Lasalle on the year over year square footage growth as compare to the year over 
year sales growth. The fascinating aspect was that there were multiple segments experiencing growth in 
sales but a decrease in their retail footprint. Albeit it was for a single year and could have been an anomaly, 
but the retail sectors that were experiencing the most square footage downsizing were books and music, 
electronics, office supplies, home improvement, and department stores, all of which have received 
significant competition from Amazon in recent years. 
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This study provided the basis for my research, as I wanted to see if e-commerce could be a possible 
explanation for the increased sales, but reduced retail footprint.  
Using the square footage data compiled from Bloomberg I analyzed a specific sector, Consumer 
Electronics, that had been greatly affected by e-commerce in recent years to see what the data showed. The 
only company in the data-set that had grown significantly since the year 2000 was Best Buy, although it 
had stalled since the recession and decreased slightly in footprint. Every other company, other than slight 
growth from hhgregg, has seen retail square footage stagnate or decrease since the year 2000. Another 
interesting aspect of this data is that we have 3 companies which have ceased to exist. With stock return 
data we see a gradual decrease before going out-of-business, but with square footage we mainly see the 
square footage stagnate and then cease to exist. There is never any significant downward trend, or square 
footage downscaling prior to liquidation.  
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Secondly I looked at an estimated average store size (total retail sq. footage / number of locations) to see if 
the retailers were perhaps downscaling in the size of their stores in response to e-commerce. Interestingly 
the only company once again that we see significant changes with is Best Buy. Originally they had some of 
the largest stores in the industry in the early 2000’s, around 55000 sq ft, but after the recession they have 
steadily downsized their stores to a size of 30000 sq ft. This has been around the average store size for the 
two remaining competing retailers, hhgregg and Conn electronics. The rest of the retailers have stuck to 
their original store sizes that we saw in the early 2001. 
The question now is whether a similar story is happening in the other retail categories, and if yes, then is e-
commerce having any impact on the variation that we are seeing. 
Financial Model Results 
In order to test e-commerce’s impact on the financial health of the big-box retailers we need to run a 
regression to see if the data showed the variable to be significant. Using the statistical analysis program 
Stata we were able to set up the model and run a fixed effects panel data-set regression. There are a total of 
395 observations in the data-set that is attached in the appendix. We ran a fixed effects model because we 
do not believe that the data is random in origin.  
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As shown from the results above, the regression, to a certain extent, confirms the original hypothesis. The 
Mecom variable has a negative coefficient and has a p value of .058. Although the ideal would be to have 
the p value be below .05, we can make the claim with at least 94% certainty that this variable is having 
some effect on the stock returns of the big-box retailers. The other variable that is not significant is the 
SMB variable, which tests to see the exposure of the data set to small cap stocks. It makes sense that this 
variable would not be significant as the data set is composed of big-box retailers, none of which would be 
classified as a small cap stock. The momentum factor is also not significant, but seems to have a negative 
effect on the model when removed so we maintained its presence in the model. 
In reality, there are likely many more variables having an effect on the stock returns of big-box retailers, 
but this model at least gives some clue that growth in market percentage of e-commerce is having some 
effect on the stock returns of these retailers. A significant amount of new data is being published on e-
commerce every year by companies like eMarketer and Forrester research, and as this body of data grows, 
we can add more to the model and make stronger claims about the growing effect of e-commerce on the 
marketplace. 
Real Estate Model Results 
In order to test whether e-commerce is having an impact on big-box retailers real estate footprint we need 
to run a regression to see if the data showed the variable to be significant. Using the statistical analysis 
program Stata we were able to set up the model and run a fixed effects panel data-set regression. There are 
a total of 236 observations in the data-set that is attached in the appendix. We ran a fixed effects model 
because we do not believe that the data is random in origin.  
 
As shown from the results above, the regression does not confirm the original hypothesis. In fact the 
Mecomlag1 variable is not significant at all and has a positive rather than negative coefficient. The 
Totalsaleslag1 variable is showing to be significant with a positive coefficient, which makes sense as we 
would expect industry-wide sales growth to result in expansion of the retail footprint. Capital expenditures 
are also significant and have a negative coefficient. This is likely due to the fact that most of the big-box 
retailers lease their buildings rather than build them. Closelag1 is significant and has a positive coefficient, 
meaning that when a business in an industry closes, it will result in positive square footage growth for the 
rest of the industry in the following year. Interesting price per square foot is not showing to be a significant 
variable in the model. 
So why is e-commerce not seeming to have a significant effect on big-box square footage growth rates? I 
believe that the model is not robust enough and there are a few issues with its structure that is preventing it 
from picking up these changes. Unlike the financial model which had 32 companies, the real estate model 
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only has 22. These 11 companies do not report total square footage numbers in their 10k’s. It is likely that 
these specific companies can have significant effect on industry data, ex. Staples and Office Max, 
Blockbuster, JoAnn Fabrics, ToysRus. The retailers that are missing make up significant portions of the 
industries that have seen large-scale e-commerce growth (Office, Books Music Video, and Toys and 
Hobby), and because they are missing we are unable to observe their possible impact on the regression. 
Secondly it is very difficult to measure the impact of companies that go out-of-business. Unlike stock 
return data that shows a downward trend in company performance, the square footage of retailers tends to 
stagnate and then drop out of the model the year it ceases to exist. There is no downward trend to measure. 
The reality is companies want to hold onto the assets that result in sales as long as possible, so they are 
likely to hold onto their stores all the way until they are liquidated. In addition it is difficult to measure how 
much impact a company dropping out of the industry will have on the other companies within that industry. 
The closelag1 variable attempts to account for this but it is difficult to measure how much of an impact it 
has on the individual retailers, and which ones are more likely to experience positive square footage growth 
as a result the next year.  
Conclusion 
Although these are valuable observations and clues as to what is happening in the retail marketplace, more 
concrete data is needed to confirm the causality of the relationships in both the financial and real estate 
models. As research progresses a few data areas are needed in order to improve the statistical model. More 
data about the individual e-commerce programs of the big-box retailers and their growth can tell us where 
the e-commerce market percentage growth is coming from, and whether a big-box retailer investing in the 
e-commerce market has any effect on their stock return. We can give better answers to questions like, as 
Home-Depot improves their e-commerce operations, are they less at risk to market penetration from online 
only retailers like Amazon?  
The second area of improvement is with the financial model. Mass digital data collection on commercial 
real estate is a relatively new phenomenon pioneered by companies like CoStar. However, there is not 
enough historical information on specific company growth in physical retail space in order to analyze e-
commerce’s impact on the real estate market. As this data set continues to grow we can improve the model 
and have greater analysis using private research from companies like Costar even if the information is not 
published in the 10k’s. It will also be interesting to analyze the growth of warehouse and distribution space 
since the dawn of e-commerce. In recent years has the growth rate of warehouse space been greater than 
storefront property? This is an intriguing question not only for real estate, but social anthropology as the 
structure of society moves away from “shopping-centered” communities into the digital world of online 
space supported by distribution centers and warehouses.  
This is a rapidly expanding area of research as our society begins to feel the effects of the digital 
revolution. This first financial model will provide a baseline for future research in this sector as we seek 
more clues the nature of this sector of the market. The second model is incomplete at this point, but 
improvements in the data-set will likely lead to more robust and revealing results.  
It is evident that e-commerce is impacting many different structures in the market and society, from the 
landlord tenant relationship, to the geography of cities. Current analysis gives us some clues as to which 
retail categories are being impacted the most. We now understand that e-commerce is a significant variable 
in impacting the stock returns of big-box retailers, especially those retail categories which have seen the 
greatest e-commerce market penetration. It is yet to be confirmed, but there are some clues that e-
commerce is impacting the commercial real estate market but the data-set and model will need to be 
improved in future iterations.  
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